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1. Executive Summary 
So far, the ECB has responded to the European twin crises of bust 
banking systems and sovereign debt crises using traditional central 
banking tools: interest rate reductions, combined with discretionary 
bond purchases. In addition, the ECB moved to take inter-bank funding 
away from the open market and transfer it to a direct loan relationship 
with the ECB (the LTRO of 8 December 2012). We welcome the last step, 
but warned that it will not be sufficient to solve the crises.  
To do that, further European centralisation and transfer of sovereignty to 
Brussels or Frankfurt are not necessary. Indeed, such a policy gain fails 
to address the fundamental problem, which has been ignored by all crisis 
measures so far: to get out of the debt spiral and vicious and self-
reinforcing circle of shrinking demand leading to weaker government 
finance and shakier banking systems,  we need a policy to trigger an 
expansion in domestic demand in the affected economies. None of the 
policies suggested by the European leaders do however boost domestic 
demand. 
Our research has demonstrated that domestic demand is a function of 
credit creation. It is currently shrinking, because credit creation is 
shrinking. Thus what is required is a new strategy, which can be 
implemented by the ECB with cooperation of national governments, and 
which aims squarely at increasing credit creation and generating 
sustainable growth and employment. 
The policy centres on an ECB package of measures to solve the bad debt 
problem in the banking system in exchange for banks’ cooperation in a 
regime of guided bank credit. The list of policies is can be found on pages 
5 and 6 of this report. 
 
 
This paper is a reproduction of a note issued by Professor Werner in his role as member of 
the ECB Shadow Council. The views expressed are his own and may differ from those of 
other members of the Shadow Council.1 
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Contribution of 27 June 2012 by Richard A. Werner 
Richard A. Werner (2012), The Euro-Crisis: A To-Do List for the ECB, University of Southampton, CBFSD Policy Discussion Paper No. 1-12. 
|   
2 Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development        University of Southampton 
The Eurocrisis: A To-Do list for the ECB    
 
As the ECB gathers for its Council meeting many wonder whether interest 
rates should be cut further.  
Further rate cuts are neither necessary nor sufficient to stimulate growth in 
the eurozone. To the contrary, they are likely to be counterproductive. Indeed, 
I would not have cut rates as much as they have been cut, due to the negative 
impact on savers. This is also recognised as a problem in the UK, where 
pension fund returns have been affected by the Bank of England’s policies.  
As I said in Japan in the early 1990s, in a recession that occurs after an asset 
bubble, we are faced with an impaired and increasingly risk-averse banking 
system. I thought I was dramatic when I said at a time when interest rates 
were above 4% in Japan that in this situation interest rates can be lowered to 
zero, and it would not have any positive impact on the economy. Little did I 
know that the Bank of Japan wanted to prove me right.   
 
The assumption that moving prices will be helpful – in this case the price of 
money, also known as the interest rate – is based on standard economic 
models where demand is supposed to equal supply, and thanks to price 
movements we obtain equilibrium. The assumptions on which such 
equilibrium models and their outcomes are based (perfect information, no 
transaction costs, complete markets, etc.) are so extreme that we know they do 
not hold in our world. Hence markets are not in equilibrium. This means we 
can be quite sure that all markets are usually rationed. Then the short-side 
principle applies: whichever quantity of supply and demand is smaller will be 
transacted.  
So if we think that lack of loan demand is the problem (as bankers and central 
bankers will inevitably argue) then lowering the price of money should 
stimulate the demand for it – and hence boost borrowing by firms and 
households, boost bank lending, and hence expand demand. Thus Japanese 
banks and the Bank of Japan have argued for over a decade that the shrinking 
bank credit growth, and later zero bank credit growth, and finally contracting 
bank credit, were due to lack of loan demand, and hence lower interest rates 
would solve the problem. After over a dozen interest rate reductions from over 
7% at the beginning of the 1990s to 0.0001% over a decade later, bank credit 
growth had not recovered.  
Today, UK banks are saying the same thing: shrinking bank credit growth is 
not due to them – they would like to lend – but there is simply no demand for 
l o a n s .  T h i s  i s  t r u e  o n l y  i n  a  v e r y  n a r r o w  s e n s e ,  a n d  h e n c e  o v e r a l l  t h i s  
statement is misleading: the banks have raised their hurdle of who qualifies as 
being credit-worthy, and only the top borrowers, mainly large firms, now 
qualify. And it is true that these large firms usually do not need to borrow 
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from banks, as they either use cash flow or capital market funding. But it is the 
small firms not able to use other channels of fund-raising that would like to 
borrow from banks – but the banks are not interested in them, even less so 
than they had been before.    
 
Likewise in Japan: in aggregate the problem was not weak loan demand, but 
the lack of credit supplied by the banks. Banks were burdened with high and 
rising amounts of bad debts – partly due to the excessive bank credit boom 
that created the asset bubble of the 1980s, which in turn was the result of the 
Bank of Japan’s window guidance, and partly due to the misguided Bank of 
Japan policy of the 1990s, which kept repeating that the problem was lack of 
loan demand and hence interest rate reductions would fix it.   
 
True Quantitative Easing 
So what did I suggest to fix Japan’s recession and banking problem? It is 
indeed the same policy that I am now advocating for the eurozone. I argued 
that a new type of monetary policy was necessary that did not focus on the 
price of money, but on its quantity. That quantity is credit creation.  
Since I did not want to be confused with monetarist proposals - and in fact 
warned that boosting bank reserves or high powered money, for instance via 
open market purchases from the banks was also doomed to fail - I needed a 
new expression for this, especially since in the Japanese language the 
expression ‘credit creation’ used to be little understood. I thus added the word 
'quantitative' to the standard expression of stimulatory monetary policy 
('monetary easing'), short 'quantitative easing'.2  
Having denied that my proposal to expand credit creation would work, the 
Bank of Japan then switched from its failed interest policy to the older, and 
also failed monetarist policy of expanding bank reserves - but had the nerve to 
call this 'quantitative easing'.   
 
H e r e  i s  t h e  l i s t  o f  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  m a k e  up true 'quantitative easing', as I 
proposed in the 1990s in Japan, adapted as policy advice for the ECB. I have 
put forward the following list of policies in my discussions at the ECB Shadow 
Council.3 
                                                             
2  Richard A. Werner (1995). How to create a recovery through ‘Quantitative Monetary Easing’. The Nihon Keizai   
Shinbun (Nikkei), 2 September 1995 (morning edition), p.26 (in Japanese). English Translation available at  
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/340476/ . 
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The ECB’s To-Do List: 
 
 
1. The ECB should purchase all non-performing assets from all Eurozone 
banks at face value, in exchange for banks agreeing to comply with a new 
‘credit guidance regime’ run by the ECB. 
 
2. The ECB should introduce and operate this new ‘credit guidance’, whereby 
the ECB via its national central banks (NCBs) requires banks to meet monthly 
and quarterly quotas concerning the growth of total credit outstanding AND 
the credit outstanding in each of the sub-categories of credit, on which banks 
have to report on a monthly basis as well, namely: 
 
   A. bank credit for GDP transactions, divided into 
        - mortgage credit to households 
          - consumer credit 
         - other credit to individuals 
         - credit to the manufacturing industry (divided into further specific 
                    industries, though no sub-targets set) 
         - credit to the construction sector 
         - credit to the non-financial service sector (divided further into 
                    specific industries) 
         - R&D, education 
         - other categories 
 
   B. bank credit for non-GDP transactions, divided into 
        - credit to other banks 
         - credit to non-bank financial institutions 
         - credit to financial or property holding companies 
        - other categories 
 
   whereby the ECB via its NCBs restricts credit to type B sectors and sets 
             positive year-on-year percentage growth targets for credit of type A.  
 
3. The ECB should institute a loan guarantee scheme for the most desirable 
types of loans, i.e. to the manufacturing sector implementing new technology, 
environmentally enhancing and sustainable energy producing sector, as well 
as in R&D and education. Loans are guaranteed by the ECB.   
 
4. The ECB should immediately re-introduce the Bundesbank’s bill 
rediscounting operations, expanded to all NCBs and extended to firms in type 
A sectors, but Eurozone-wide, via the NCBs.   
 
5. Until above scheme has got traction, the ECB, via its NCBs introduces a new 
direct lending facility whereby the NCBs extend credit to type A sector 
borrowers. 
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6. The ECB should introduce a new scheme, whereby the ECB and NCBs meet 
with the national finance/treasury ministries and debt management offices in 
order to end the issuance of government bonds in the markets and instead 
fund all public sector borrowing requirements (that must meet unchanged 
Brussels budgetary requirements) through direct loan contracts from the 
national banks. This reduces borrowing costs sharply, as the prime rate is 
lower, helps banks as their business expands without further capital adequacy 
requirements (risk weights are zero), while the loans do not need to be 
marked to market, but can be used for ECB refinancing. (The Werner-
Siekmann proposal).   
 
7. The ECB should meet with national bank regulators, the European Banking 
Authority and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in order 
to negotiate release of eurozone banks from the Basel capital adequacy 
standards for the coming three years, until bank credit growth and hence 
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